The decision of the Bangladeshi government to ban the activities of the country’s oldest, and one of the largest, political parties, the Awami League (AL), has added another loop in its already complicated political mosaic. As it stands, all activities of the AL are banned under the Anti-Terrorism Act until the trial of the party and its leaders is completed by the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT).
Ever since the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government in August 2024, the students, who were at the frontlines of the July uprising, have been clamouring for a ban. For them, it’s a logical sequence of events, as without any tangible measure taken against the AL and its leaders, their sacrifices would be in vain. The anger against everything that the AL stood for has led to student leaders advocating for a “second republic” in Bangladesh. This republic is envisaged as one that will hold the previous regime and its leaders accountable for their sustained transgressions.
This is a critical juncture in Bangladesh’s politics. The country may soon go to polls without one of its most prominent parties. The legal procedures for ICT trials are time-consuming, and thus, Bangladesh is likely to hold democratic elections without a full democracy in place — not too different from its previous experience under the Hasina government. After the Hasina government was overthrown, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) had called for early elections with the participation of the AL. It was looking well poised to capture the majority of the votes even without the ban.
The ban essentially means that the Opposition space now remains wide open for the entry of right-wing parties. The other centrist party, the Jatiya Party, does not enjoy a nationwide presence. In the absence of the AL, there is also the likelihood of a coalition of centrist and right-wing parties, including the newly formed National Citizen Party and the Jamaat. The religion genie, once out, cannot be bottled back in.
Bans on political parties, as seen elsewhere around the world, have limited efficacy. At some point, either through the completion of a judicial process or a political development, the AL will re-emerge. But by then, the AL might find it difficult to fight the wave of majoritarianism that would have taken over. Hasina’s previous flirtations with Hefazat-e-Islam were rooted in these concerns. Bangladesh’s voters usually go for parties that are not extremist, like the AL and the BNP. The appeal for religious parties till now had been rather limited. That could change now.
The interim government, with the support of the radical groups it seems to be pandering to, could defer the upcoming elections. The NCP and the Jamaat have much ground to cover and so there is little incentive to hold early elections. While Army Chief Waker-Uz-Zaman has, on a few occasions, spoken about having elections within 18 months of Hasina’s ouster, there has been no such commitment by the interim government.
The interim government will attempt to usher in reform on the lines of the reports of the various reform committees. There are discussions underway for constitutional reform too, as well as a popular demand to limit a prime minister’s tenure to two terms. The previous International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh under the Hasina government, formed to prosecute Bangladeshis, mostly of the Jamaat, for alleged crimes during 1971 while supporting the Pakistan military, was accused of not being neutral. This time around, under an unelected government, it may not be any different for the AL (now on the receiving end).
While political uncertainties continue to exist, Bangladesh has steadied its economy compared to last year. That people have reposed faith in this government can be insinuated from the fact that Bangladesh received a record-high $3.29 billion in remittances in March this year, marking the highest monthly inflow in the country’s history. The country’s famous ready-made garment industry has overcome challenges and resumed production for international orders once again.
With the exception of India, the ban has elicited no response from external powers. Chief Advisor to the Interim Government Muhammad Yunus seems to be enjoying support domestically and internationally. Dhaka is hurting without Delhi’s support but it seems to be holding up well. But the costs of not cooperating with India are higher for Bangladesh. It doesn’t seem to realise that yet.
The writer is Professor at the Jindal School of International Affairs, O P Jindal Global University, and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore