SINCE the ouster of the Hasina-led government, Bangladesh has strongly indicated that it wants to strengthen relations between the two countries to ensure a democratic South Asia while also resolving the issue of the liberation war of 1971 with Pakistan. Bangladesh-Pakistan relations were strained during Hasina’s 15-year rule. However, the leadership change in Dhaka has led to hopes in Islamabad for improving relations.
Bangladesh-Pakistan relations can hardly be defined as friendly, with religion, love for, and support for each other’s cricket teams being the only consistent high note. With the last AL government in power for more than 15 years, with unequivocal support and patronage from India, the relationship between Bangladesh and Pakistan was frozen. When Imran Khan came to power, there was a clear initiative to thaw the relations with Imran Khan, making explicit overtures to improve relations. Imran Khan praised Hasina’s and Bangladesh’s economic achievements and was critical of Pakistani army actions in 1971, which were well received by the Bangladeshis. His overtures led to Bangladesh’s approval of appointing a new Pakistani High Commissioner after two years in 2019. A prime ministerial telephone call in July 2020, followed by a meeting between Imran Khan and the Bangladesh foreign minister, expedited the thawing of relations. Then, the inevitable happened in Pakistan’s politics: Imran Khan, the most popular and democratically astute leader, was ousted, and Bangladesh-Pakistan relations reverted to their frosty patterns.
Bangladesh’s independence, Bangladesh has followed a strategy of seeking to live in concord with all. However, geopolitical and geostrategic realities compelled Bangladesh to have India at the centre of Bangladesh’s foreign policy, forcing much of everything else in the region to become peripheral. Add to that the crony political compulsions epitomised by the Hasina-led government, and lo and behold, Bangladesh’s regional policy outlook became Indianised extensively. The situation has neither created opportunities nor challenges for Bangladesh; however, it allowed the AL government to maintain a policy aligned with Indian preferences, resulting in closer ties with the Indian government. The complexity was such that a Pakistani visa on a Bangladeshi passport was likely a clear red flag, causing Indian visa rejection for Bangladesh. Any mention of Pakistan in and around a Bangladeshi individual’s existence
Consequently, Bangladesh’s foreign policy towards Pakistan reinforced animosity, and it was easy to achieve, as the AL government had capitalised on the already prevailing and appropriate grievances in Bangladesh against Pakistan for its role in 1971. Since 71, bilateral relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan have been bumpy, as Pakistan, angered by the loss in the war, followed the ‘Hallstein doctrine’, severing diplomatic relations with any country that recognised Bangladesh’s sovereignty. This policy was unsustainable, as most countries eventually did. After that, the Organisation of Islamic Countries (then called the Organisation of Islamic Conference) intervened, bringing about a détente between the two member countries. In the following decades, Bangladesh and Pakistan relations developed in phases. Still, the remnants and consequential issues of the 1971 war remained at the core of it, with Bangladesh continuing to demand apology and reparations from Pakistan. Diplomatic spats followed the differences over the trials of those accused of war crimes in Bangladesh. Political quarters within Bangladesh, led mainly by religious groups, remained amenable and connected to Pakistan. Historically, the BNP and Jamaat have been critical of Bangladesh being too subservient to India, a sentiment that had become pervasive across the country and remains a key reason for the high anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh.
Still, the executive and dominant political authorities remained averse to Pakistan despite geopolitical realism insinuating otherwise. The situation was such that the aversion to Pakistan was being translated into as many forms and avenues within Bangladesh as possible, resulting in the suspension of direct flights between Dhaka and Karachi. No top government-level visit between the two countries occurred for years, and the foreign secretary consultations remained suspended since 2016, as does the Joint Economic Commission between the two countries. There had been very little interaction between Bangladesh and Pakistan. Even goods imported from Pakistan were subject to 100 per cent physical inspection, contrary to the treatment of all other imports from across the world.
Now, we see renewed enthusiasm with the Indian subservient political ideology ousted from the helm. Bangladesh’s government indicates that it is following a new foreign policy approach that does not pivot on India. At the same time, Pakistan is also strengthening its outreach to Bangladesh. Improvements are visible. Bilateral meetings with the High Commissioner of Pakistan and overtures from Islamabad, i.e., no visa fee for Bangladesh, are underscoring Pakistan’s interest in improving relations with Bangladesh, which is responding in kind by withdrawing the inspection of Pakistani goods and being open to Pakistan’s outreaches.
However, it does not mean that Bangladesh’s issues are resolved. Bangladesh has long sought and will continue demanding an apology from Pakistan for its actions in 1971 and international recognition of the genocide. There are concerns within domestic and international quarters that Bangladesh is cosying up to Pakistan to explicitly point out to India that it no longer is subservient while indicating that the Indian role in Bangladesh’s politics in the last 15 years has been unacceptable. Some security experts think that for Pakistan, having close relations with Bangladesh is pivoted on its ongoing adverse relations with India and not on Pakistan’s regional relations enhancement. While anti-India sentiment runs deep in Bangladesh, Pakistan’s efforts to improve ties with Dhaka should not be based on protracted rivalry and aversion to India. Instead, Pakistan should focus on the shared cultural and religious values. Both countries should consider opportunities to boost trade, business, and investment. For Bangladesh, Pakistan can be a good and reliable source of cotton and other RMG backward linkage. Moreover, there are reports that Pakistan has found the world’s fourth-largest oil reserves. If so, Bangladesh can consider having a bilateral agreement with Pakistan to source energy resources on a priority basis, offering strategic depth and security to Bangladesh.
For Pakistan, relations with Bangladesh are a matter of international image enhancement and regional cooperation improvement. However, concerns about any adverse covert interests targeted towards its anti-India curvatures will remain, and vigilance against such sentiments is warranted. At the same time, Bangladesh must keep a keen eye on maintaining a realist approach to its foreign policy, especially regarding India, which remains an important regional country and a business partner with a more than 4,000km border. Bangladesh’s improving relations with Pakistan must not be an anti-India bandwagon but rather a realist approach to foreign relations that the country had to overlook in the past. For Pakistan, acknowledgement of war crimes, the need for an apology, and the subsequent normalisation of relations must be a priority.
Simon Mohsin is a political analyst.