ZIAUR Rahman is a remarkable personality in the study of Bangladeshi politics, in one respect, at least: how a former army officer whose political career spanned only about three years and a half could surpass established and professional politicians and still remain, even after almost half a century, such a relevant and popular figure in politics. Political analysts may emphasise three points to explain this phenomenon: (1) Ziaur Rahman’s astonishing personal honesty, (2) a political programme initiated and offered by him that was in harmony with the people’s sense of life, beliefs, hopes and aspirations, which, in the context of that time, can be considered political reform, and (3) the proposal for an inclusive identity for the people through Bangladeshi nationalism. In the search for reasons Ziaur Rahman has remained relevant and popular in politics even half a century after his death, the three points are all important. I will, however, focus only on the third point.
Nationalism is a political, cultural and ideological concept that unites a group of people on the basis of language, culture, history, ethnicity and territory. In general, in the nationalist idea, the people united by these components either form a state or hold aspirations to form one. On the basis of nationalism, Bangladeshis were able to establish an independent state while the Palestinians have not yet been able to form such a state. Nevertheless, in the context of their desire and struggle to form an independent state, the Palestinians are recognised as a nation, at least, to many. For a group of people to become a nation, it is, therefore, a necessary condition either to form a state of their own or to hold aspirations to form such a state.
None of language, culture, history, religion and ethnicity can turn a group of people into a nation if they do not form a state of their own or do not desire to form one. The territorial basis of nationalism as a necessary condition for nationhood was a concept first properly realised, among the politicians of Bangladesh, by Ziaur Rahman. And from that realisation, he wanted to inspire everyone towards a Bangladesh-based nationalism founded on state territory. He understood that the sense that has united, and can continue to unite, all the people is the feeling of a territorial integrity of the 148,000 square kilometers. This feeling concerning the territory — the land that constitutes our state, Bangladesh — has created our sense of nationalism and tied us all together with a common thread.
There is overwhelming factual evidence that the core and necessary element of nationalism and national consciousness is territory — the state, in other words. As for America and Britain as examples, although the people of America and Britain are identical in terms of language and culture, they have not become the same nation. They are divided into two nations — Americans and the British. Why? Because, they did not form a single state nor do they have any intention of forming such a unified state. Although language and culture may contribute to shaping national consciousness, they cannot, therefore, serve as the foundation of nationalism. Linguistic and cultural similarity does not make a nation. The Americans, having many languages and many cultures, have become a great nation on the basis of territorial unity. Ziaur Rahman recognised this reality and that is why he clearly rejected the language-based nationalism.
Did Ziaur Rahman, then, try to establish a religion-based nationalism? Is his Bangladeshi nationalism, therefore, an Islamic nationalism? There is, indeed, such a narrative that Ziaur Rahman had sought to establish a religion-based nationalism or that his idea of Bangladeshi nationalism was a form of Islamic nationalism. Those who advance this narrative often point to his inclusion of ‘Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim’ in the beginning of the Bangladesh constitution and the adoption of ‘absolute trust and faith in the Almighty Allah’ as one of the fundamental principles of the state policy. The proponents of this view are mostly associated with political opposition to Ziaur Rahman. However, the attempt to portray Bangladeshi nationalism as religious or Islamic arises from a mistaken observation. Ziaur Rahman never sought to establish a religion-based or Islamic nationalism.
On the contrary, he highlighted the failure of such nationalism. He pointed out that the failure of religion-based nationalism could be understood through the collapse of Jamaluddin Afghani’s pan-Islamism. In his view, a clear example of the failure of religion-based nationalism was Pakistan’s inability to maintain its territorial integrity as a state. He stated plainly: ‘Then again, the Muslim League, IDL, and the Jamaatis speak of religion-based nationalism. At the beginning of this century, Jamaluddin Afghani raised the slogan of pan-Islamism. The idea of religion-based nationalism originates from there. To speak the truth, after the establishment of Pakistan, in the name of religion-based nationalism, Bangladesh was subjected to exploitation and rule. But this “politics of exploitation” in the name of religion-based nationalism could not keep Pakistan united. As a result, an independent and sovereign Bangladesh was established.’ Therefore, from Ziaur Rahman’s perspective, the emergence of Bangladesh disproves the viability of religion-based nationalism. And one must admit that his observation was accurate. If religion-based nationalism were viable, we could see the formation of a single Muslim nation in the Middle East. In Europe, perhaps, a single Christian nation would have emerged. But none of this has occurred, which demonstrates the impracticality of religion-based nationalism.
Ziaur Rahman explicitly rejected the notion of ethnic or racial nationalism. In his discourse, he acknowledged the concept and cited Hitler’s German nationalism as a negative example. Within the context of Bangladesh, he emphasised the unsuitability and inapplicability of ethnic or racial nationalism. There is, indeed, ample empirical evidence demonstrating that ethnicity or race is not a necessary condition to the formation of a nation. For instance, although the peoples of Saudi Arabia and Yemen share a common ethnicity, they remain distinct nations — Saudis and Yemenis. Conversely, a diverse array of ethnic groups has collectively constituted the Canadian nation, unified solely on the basis of territorial integrity. Numerous additional examples illustrate that shared ethnicity does not invariably translate into a single nation. The Somali ethnic group, for example, is divided across state boundaries, with some identifying as Somalis and others as Ethiopians. Similarly, individuals of German ethnic origin may belong to different nations, such as Germany or Austria. Thus, from Ziaur Rahman’s perspective, ethnic or racial nationalism is inadequate as a unifying principle for nationhood. His observations underscore the primacy of territorial-based nationalism as the foundational basis for national identity, especially within the context of Bangladesh.
Does Ziaur Rahman’s conception of Bangladeshi nationalism, then, completely exclude language, culture or religion? Not at all. Rather, the Bangladeshi nationalism that he promoted fully acknowledges the important role these factors play in strengthening national consciousness. In his words: ‘We have our ethnic pride, a rich language, and a religious tradition. Geographically, we inhabit a strategically important region… and we are all immersed in the spirit of a bloody struggle for independence. Never before have so many components come together in a single nationalist consciousness anywhere.’
From this, it is evident that Ziaur Rahman emphasised two aspects of nationalism: (1) the foundational basis of nationalism and (2) the key contributors to national consciousness. According to him, the territorial basis constitutes the foundation of Bangladeshi nationalism while our language, culture, religious tradition and the spirit of the liberation war serve as significant contributors to the development and sustenance of that national consciousness. It is, therefore, clear that Bangladeshi nationalism does not reject the Bengali identity of the vast majority of the people. It, rather, incorporates this identity as a cultural and linguistic contributor to Bangladeshi nationalism. Consequently, invoking Bengali identity as a counterpoint to criticise Bangladeshi nationalism does not constitute a particularly strong argument.
In this context, the roles of religion and the spirit of the liberation war as contributors to national consciousness deserve a special emphasis. As mentioned earlier, Ziaur Rahman’s conception of Bangladeshi nationalism is not religion-based despite the existence of a deliberately propagated narrative suggesting otherwise. While he stated that his nationalism is not grounded in religion, he also indicated that the beliefs, traditions, rights and the recognition of every religion are integral to the nationalism that he promoted. His version of Bangladeshi nationalism in no way neglects religion or its traditions although it is not religion-based nationalism. As he put it: ‘Attachment to religion is a great and eternal characteristic of the Bangladeshi nation. At the same time, the Holy Qur’an says, ‘La ikraha fid-din’ — there is no compulsion in religion. Therefore, “Bangladeshi nationalis” is neither religion-based nor religion-averse.’ Thus, his version of nationalism may be described as occupying a middle ground between theocracy and secularism, an approach that had remained unexplored in this region.
Some critics claim that Ziaur Rahman’s conception of Bangladeshi nationalism is incompatible with the spirit of the liberation war. This claim is, without doubt, wrong. As we have already seen, Ziaur Rahman described the foundation and contributors to national identity as being ‘immersed in the spirit of a bloody struggle for independence.’ As a decorated war hero and a key proclaimer of independence who received the gallantry award of Bir Uttam, it is implausible that he would promote a form of nationalism that contradicts the spirit of the liberation war. Such claims appear to be driven more by political motivations than by historical or theoretical accuracy.
On the contrary, we see that Ziaur Rahman made it clear: ‘Nationalism reaches its highest point through war. When the inspiration of nationalism peaks, a nation engages in war to achieve independence. It is through such a war and nationalism that Bangladesh was created.’ He also stated, ‘The bloodied revolution took place in 1971 through the war of independence. At the root of that war was nationalism.’ One might expect his critics to object that the liberation war was fought under the banner of Bengali nationalism and that by introducing Bangladeshi nationalism in place of Bengali nationalism, Ziaur Rahman rejected that legacy.
However, those who make this claim focus solely on the emergence of the term ‘Bangladeshi nationalism’ without examining the underlying consciousness that it represents. There is no doubt that the term ‘Bangladeshi nationalism’ arose after 1971, particularly in the post-1975 period. Yet, this is merely a linguistic fact. While the term was not in use before 1975, the consciousness that it articulates predated not only 1975 but even 1971. This very consciousness gradually led the inhabitants of this 148,000-square kilometer territory towards the liberation war. Our language and culture, indeed, played important roles in shaping and strengthening this national consciousness. However, if the liberation war had truly been the result of Bengali nationalism, rooted solely in shared language and culture, then we would have been motivated to create a nation that included not only the then East Pakistan but also West Bengal — forming a state (Bangladesh) spanning 240,000 square kilometres. Yet, neither we nor the people of West Bengal harboured such an ambition. This demonstrates that the nationalist sentiment which fuelled our liberation war was primarily based on territorial identity, with language and culture serving as important but contributory, rather than foundational, elements.
Of course, the term ‘Bangladeshi nationalism’ had not yet been coined at the time, creating a semantic gap. Critics of Bangladeshi nationalism have exploited this gap by conflating Bengali culture with Bengali nationalism — an interpretive error that persists today. However, Ziaur Rahman clearly understood the distinction and stated emphatically: ‘The country became independent in 1971 through war. But the current of Bangladeshi nationalism predates that by a long time. The history of Bangladeshi nationalism is long; the history of Bangladesh is short. Bangladeshi nationalism gradually matured and, through various contexts both domestic and international, pushed us toward the goal of independence. That inspiration was so strong that the people were prepared to fight for freedom. We fought the war of liberation in 1971.’
Even Ziaur Rahman’s most severe critics cannot easily deny this foundational truth. One of them, Anthony Mascarenhas, wrote: ‘Zia’s real contribution to Bangladesh was that he gave the people a distinctive identity and gave them pride in being Bangladeshis…. The Proclamations (Amendment) Order 1977 had stipulated that the people should be known as “Bangladeshis” instead of “Bengalees”. At first glance this seemed to be merely window-dressing. In fact it was a fundamental appreciation of the raison d’être for the state. To his credit General Zia, more than any of the other FFs (freedom fighters), realized that the people had moved forward from the tremendous emotional upsurge of the Bangladesh movement and the liberation war.’ Indeed, Ziaur Rahman’s observations on the existence, role, and significance of Bangladeshi nationalism in the context of the liberation war — observations which, in my view, are correct — deserve further academic and theoretical investigation.
Thus, we see that Ziaur Rahman’s concept of Bangladeshi nationalism as a territorially based nationalism acknowledges and values the roles of contributors such as language, culture, history and religious heritage. For this reason, it is more liberal and widely acceptable than nationalism based solely on language and culture or on religion. Ziaur Rahman, therefore, called it comprehensive nationalism. This comprehensive nationalism, or Bangladeshi nationalism, is more inclusive and acceptable than nationalism based on language and culture or Bengali nationalism because while Bengali nationalism excludes the core national consciousness of non-Bengali residents, Bangladeshi nationalism includes both Bengali and non-Bengali people equally and with equal dignity.
That is why communities such as the Chakmas, the Santals and the Garos are included in this nationalism just as much as the Bengali-speaking communities and they can be equally inspired by the same national consciousness. Similarly, Bangladeshi nationalism is more liberal and acceptable than religion-based nationalism because whereas religion-based nationalism fails to include religious minorities with equal dignity, Bangladeshi nationalism successfully includes people of all religious communities within the same national framework and inspires them with a shared sense of nationhood. In simple terms, where language-, culture- or religion-based nationalism tends to be exclusive, Bangladeshi comprehensive nationalism is inclusive. This inclusivity is what has made it widely acceptable. At the heart of this inclusivity lies the foundational national consciousness rooted in the territory of 148,000 square kilometres called Bangladesh that we achieved through a bloody war in 1971.
When we hear discussions today about inclusive politics or about politics centred on Bangladesh (often referred to as Bangladeshism or Bangladeshpanthi politics), we, therefore, find Ziaur Rahman’s conception of Bangladeshi nationalism at their core. As the proponent of this vision, Ziaur Rahman will certainly be remembered with respect for many years to come, perhaps, even beyond this century.
Dr Mostofa Nazmul Mansur is a professor of philosophy in Jahangirnagar University.