These developments not only carry profound domestic implications but also pose serious strategic and national security challenges for India.
Disowning the ‘Father of the Nation’
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, revered as the Father of the Nation, symbolized Bangladesh’s historic break from Pakistan and its embrace of a secular, Bengali nationalism. His leadership in the 1971 liberation war, in collaboration with Indian forces, laid the moral and political bedrock of the republic. His most prominent statue that once stood in Dhaka’s Mrityunjayee Prangan was not merely a monument; it was a manifestation of the state’s ideological origin story.
The toppling of the statue and destruction following Hasina’s fall by Islamist crowds was an unmistakable political and symbolic repudiation of Mujib’s legacy. That repudiation was institutionalized a few days ago, when the Bangladesh Bank issued new Taka 1,000, 50, and 20 notes, pointedly omitting Mujib’s image and replacing it with symbols associated with the protest movement. Even more controversially, reports emerged that the interim government had quietly revoked Mujib’s status as a freedom-fighter — a move officially denied, but widely believed to be accurate.
These acts are not isolated decisions. They represent a conscious attempt by the emergent political class to move Bangladesh’s ideological compass from secularism and regional solidarity with India toward Islamist radicalism and a flirtation with the ideological memory of Pakistan.
A new East Pakistan?
Historical revisionism is now visibly underway. The new regime has embarked on a process of educational reform, repositioning Ziaur Rahman, the founder of the opposition BNP and a figure with more ambiguous ties to Pakistan, as the true architect of independence. National holidays commemorating Mujib’s birth and death have been removed, and his portrait has been taken down from key state institutions.This erasure of historical memory is accompanied by a resurgence of Islamist narratives. Extremist elements, long marginal in Bangladeshi mainstream politics, have found new political space in the post-Hasina vacuum. Minority Hindu community, historically protected under Awami League governments, has faced large-scale violence and intimidation even as the interim government under Yunus has largely remained silent or tried to negate anti-Hindu violence.What is emerging is a Bangladesh that increasingly resembles the ideological contours of the very state it fought to separate from in 1971, a state defined less by cultural identity and more by Islamist jihadi politics.
What Bangladesh’s slide into past means for India
These internal realignments in Bangladesh have immediate and long-term implications for India, arguably its most consequential regional partner. India’s relationship with Bangladesh has historically been defined by shared narratives of liberation, linguistic nationalism and secular values. A Bangladesh that questions its break from Pakistan also implicitly questions the legitimacy of India’s role in its birth, thereby altering the moral basis of bilateral cooperation.
During Hasina’s rule, India did not have to face Islamist radicalism in the east. The resurgence of extremist networks in Bangladesh, particularly those with pan-Islamist sympathies, risks turning the country into a breeding ground for cross-border militancy. Bangladesh’s transition has seen the quiet rehabilitation of Islamist clerics and organizations once deemed threats to regional security. If these groups gain deeper political footholds, India’s vulnerable northeastern states may face renewed infiltration, radicalization and communal unrest, which India had experienced during the rule of Khaleda Zia who had friendly ties with Pakistan.
India and Bangladesh share one of the world’s longest porous borders. Political instability, combined with the growing persecution of minorities, could precipitate a renewed wave of migration into Indian territory, particularly into Assam, Tripura, and West Bengal. Such an influx would not only strain local resources but also reignite longstanding ethnic and communal tensions within India.
With the retreat of pro-India leadership in Bangladesh as it has recently banned ousted PM Hasina’s party Awami League, there are growing indications that Bangladesh may deepen its engagements with Pakistan and China. This includes signs of increased economic and military consultations. A trilateral alignment among these states, however informal, would create a new axis of friction in South Asia, complicating India’s efforts to maintain regional equilibrium. Reportedly, Bangladesh has invited China to develop an old airport near Chicken’s Neck area, India’s sensitive border zone.
India must now approach Bangladesh not as a post-liberation ally, but as a fluid and potentially adversarial neighbor. India needs a recalibrated strategy grounded in realism rather than sentiment. This includes enhanced border surveillance, renewed investment in counter-radicalization initiatives in eastern India, and robust diplomatic engagement with minority groups and civil society actors within Bangladesh, in addition increased military vigilance.
At stake is not merely the future of bilateral relations, but the strategic architecture of South Asia. Another Pakistan on India’s eastern border will plunge the subcontinent into permanent unrest.