Bangladesh faces political turmoil, economic decline, and uncertainty, impacting its relationship with India and future stability.
PUNE: When the Pakistani and Bangladeshi cricket teams both lost their qualifying matches to India and then crashed out of the prestigious Champions Trophy in just six days, it was an ignominious fall. Predictably, India was blamed for their sorry state of affairs—from not allowing their players to participate in the cash-rich IPL, not playing matches in Pakistan, and even selecting venues that gave an unfair advantage. Neither country cared to look within for the root causes of their malaise.
The downward trajectory of the two nations is not just restricted to sports. Ever since Bangladeshi students, radicals, and opposition parties launched their movement which unseated Sheikh Hasina’s government and forced her to flee to India, Bangladesh has been in a state of churn. An interim government under Nobel Laureate Mohammed Yunus took over on August 24 with the promise of stability and early elections. But they are fast learning that running a government is far more difficult than upending it. Law and order have broken down, attacks against minorities have turned world opinion against the government, and images of students burning the residence of the father of the nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and defiling his statues, do not speak well of what is happening there. Internally, the interim government is also riven by dissension. It seems to be dictated by the fundamentalists and rabid students, whom Professor Yunus is unwilling or unable to control. The first split in the government came with the resignation of student leader Nahid Islam—one of the key architects of what is now euphemistically called “The Movement”—who left to float his own political party. All this has led the Army Chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, to issue a stern warning to politicians about, “Fighting amongst ourselves and leading the country to an anarchy of our own making.” This pronouncement has raised fears of a likely takeover by the army, just as it did in the chaos of 1975 and 2007.
Bangladesh has a history of successful and unsuccessful army takeovers, but as in Pakistan, the army may not want to take over a nation in complete chaos and prefer to call the shots from the background instead. There is already complete political turmoil with the removal of the Awami League government, which had ruled the country for the past 15 years, and the purging of its cadres. Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party has yet to get its act together after years in the wilderness. Though it has returned to the political mainstream as the major national party, its cadres and leadership are weak and disjointed. In this vacuum, fundamentalist parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami- whose ban was recently revoked by the interim government—are emerging as a major force, capable of harnessing millions of supporters. There is considerable uncertainty now, but the situation may change considerably. The Chief Elections Commissioner has stated that there are no grounds to prevent the Awami League from contesting, and if it is allowed to participate in the general elections, likely to be held on December 25, it could mobilise the prevailing sentiment of fear and uncertainty to rouse its cadres and make another bid for power. This time, it could use Sheikh Hasina’s son, Sajeeb Wazed, as the face of the party, in place of his unpopular mother. But that is a big ‘if.’ As of now, just like the PTI in Pakistan, the Bangladeshi establishment will try to finish it as a political force and place a more suppliant party like the BNP at the helm of government. The kingmakers could well be parties like Jamaat-e-Islami—who could use their considerable clout to help form the new government—and then dictate terms, just as the fundamentalist parties did in Pakistan.
Bangladesh’s economic woes are also unlikely to improve in the present scenario. Sheikh Hasina’s policies had enabled Bangladesh to grow consistently at around 7%, and its economy was on the rise. But then came COVID, and the economy began tanking, forcing the country to approach the International Monetary Fund for a bailout of $4.7 billion in 2023—the first time in its history (Pakistan, in comparison, has reached out to the IMF for a record 25 times). New investments are nowhere in the offing. China, which has already poured in over $31 billion in BRI investments in Bangladesh, is easing off on new investments. Like Pakistan—in which China has invested over $64 billion—the returns are not forthcoming, and if anything, have placed both countries in a spiral of debt. Even its much-vaunted garment industry, which provides 11% of its GDP, is affected by the turmoil, as orders shift to India and Vietnam. And the energy crisis is just beginning. Its internal power production has dropped to half, and it has been unable to repay the dues it owes to power companies like the Adani group, which forced the group to halt the supply of over 1,600 MW of power to Bangladesh. The choke on energy could impact the entire economy and lead to the same 18-hour blackouts that are common in Karachi and Lahore.
Much of the anger towards Sheikh Hasina’s autocratic government was deflected towards India after she was given shelter in Delhi. She was increasingly projected as being pro-India, and her policies were painted as “a sell-out.” Ironically, it was those very policies that gave Bangladesh the stability for its economy to grow. There is a strong anti-India sentiment there—which our intelligence agencies failed to gauge—and it needs to be checked. Eventually, it may peter out as realpolitik takes over, but it is up to Bangladesh to decide what sort of relationship they want with India. Friendly ties would be beneficial to both; rancorous ones could prove far more detrimental to Bangladesh itself. Inimical relations could also lead to further instability, and the economic and social spiral could be difficult to control later. India wants friendly ties with a stable Bangladesh, which will provide security on our eastern flank, and will use carrot-and-stick diplomacy to attain that. But a lot will depend on Bangladesh’s actions, which will determine the trajectory of the relationship.
In the unfolding turn of events, Bangladesh seems to have edged closer to Pakistan, even denying their role in the 1970s genocide and discounting India’s role in their War of Independence. Direct trade was resumed for the first time since 1971, with a shipment of 50,000 tonnes of rice from Pakistan to Bangladesh. The shape of their relations is an internal matter, but while the two may try to remove the burden of history, they can never break the barriers of geography. Many in Pakistan have already realised that much of their travails have been caused by their needlessly hostile policies towards India. That is a lesson of history that perhaps Bangladesh itself can learn.
For India, having two unstable nations on either side is worrisome. Pakistan is faced with increasing political, economic, and social chaos, growing insurgency in Waziristan and Balochistan, and hostility from Afghanistan. But it has been on the edge of the abyss for many years now. The army is strong enough to prevent the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and other fundamentalist groups from taking over, and Pakistan is too large and important to be allowed to implode. It will continue lingering on in this manner for quite some time to come. For long-term economic, social, and political development, there has to be a complete change of mindset—especially with regards to India—for it to become truly stable. The same holds true for Bangladesh as well, even though there is greater fear of fundamentalists taking over there. The spillover of that would be even more dangerous for India.
We are still in the “Wait and Watch” period as Bangladesh goes through its transition. A major milestone will be the holding of elections and then the formation of an elected government—whichever it may be. That will set the tone for future ties. But whichever government comes to power—if it does—the country still needs to look inwards, reflect, mend ties with India, and not blame it for all its ills—including their cricketing defeats.
* Ajay Singh is the international award-winning author of seven books and over 200 articles. He is a regular contributor to The Sunday Guardian.